Note, in the above post - there are ways to strategize about using your mind well. Sleeping well, moderating diet, being cautious to how caffeine intake gives you that big lack of energy if you drink too much, being careful what kinds of music you listen to and the quality of environment around you - finding out quiet places, or thinking places, not distracting your mind too much with lots of images and movies all the time...
That sounds suspiciously like the ascetic life.
Yet, surprisingly (?) it does not seem any graduate students follow the above advice for keeping one's brain healthy. As a general rule, grad students don't sleep enough, and overload on caffeine, or illegally obtain prescription drugs to concentrate longer (especially in high pressure schools), get drunk on the weekends (I know of someone who insists he writes best hungover), eat junk food, don't exercise, listen to what we feel like, although some music is just too distracting, study in noisy coffee shops (which, granted, are also good thinking places - I wonder why?), and as a general rule, although we may think about the short term effects of our actions on our mind, we rarely think of the long-term ones.
But the Greeks did, and not with a simple utilitarian desire to maximize their brainpower:
"In his masterful study of ancient philosophy, Philosophy as a Way of Life, Pierre Hadot has called our attention to the intensely practical character of philosophy in the Greco-Roman world. Far from being a merely academic, intellectual exercise of asserting and demonstrating "cognitive claims," all the schools of philosophy in the ancient world were forms of training—of askêsis—that sought to reshape the student's basic sensibilities and attitudes so that he or she could not only come to know the highest truths but could also actually live in light of them. Conceived in this way, ancient philosophy can be seen to have concentrated on what Hadot calls "spiritual exercises" which had as their purpose cultivating the student not simply as a "knower" but in his or her total existence: "We can perhaps get a better idea of this spiritual exercise if we understand it as an attempt to liberate ourselves from a partial, passionate point of view— linked to the senses and the body—so as to rise to the universal, normative viewpoint of thought, submitting ourselves to the demands of the Logos and the norm of the Good. Training for death is training to die to one's individuality and passions, in order to look at things from the perspective of universality and objectivity." (94-95) [-a description from an article by Ligne]
[RIP, Pierre Hadot - February 21, 1922 – April 24, 2010]
So, asceticism seems profoundly linked to seeking and trying to live the truth.
Philosophy today is not about truth. It is about either what other people have said, or whether their arguments were valid (as in, sound, not true), and maybe their applications to political issues sometimes. I have spoken to several philosophy graduate students here who switched from English to philosophy... because the tools for arguing were much more refined. Not because they wanted to get to something after their arguments.
Why we are in the place we are today is a long story, and involves names like Duns Scotus, Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre. The list could go on. Perhaps that will come in a different post, perhaps not.
My interest here is simply to point out that there seems inherently a friendship between philosophy and asceticism, which bridges right into the question of the medieval debates about the theologian, and whether his proper identity should be a scholastic (Abelard, Aquinas, etc) or a monk (Bernard). Tied up in this question is prayer. What is the relation between philosophy, asceticism, and prayer?
To be continued: Evagrius and Plotinus.
Friday, April 30, 2010
Thursday, April 22, 2010
The Life of the Mind, Part I
Graduate school is a very interesting thing.
I have come to realize first, that it's not just about learning things. That's an undergraduate's job: absorb, learn, expand, wonder at the beautiful and marvelous world we live in! But real scholars do not simply listen - they speak and produce. That is for PhD students to worry about, mostly - producing journal articles and dissertations and conference papers.
At the MA level, you are caught in between. You must be open and listening, to get a broad base, and yet you must start to turn towards production. But in order to do so, there are many new frameworks one must take in; it is not just theology I am learning.
There is the framework of my discipline - theology is subdivided into fields, and these fields all have their own ways of speaking and thinking. I cannot speak like a systematician in a historical class; I must be sensitive to the approach and the questions that are being asked. (more on this for another post) So what kinds of questions must I be asking, what kinds of answers will people find helpful within the context of this field?
There is also the framework of my own mind. Many jobs are about simply doing things, and perhaps finding small ways to streamline your tasks to the ultimate goal, but the things you are modifying are tasks, protocols, stages, actions. To understand the process of graduate study is to come to know what this instrument is, this mind of mine, and how I can use it, and how I can't use it. There is first of all finding out how I think - in theology it is astonishingly easy to find one's sub-discipline simply by examining the nature of one's mental tools - what kinds of questions do you ask? If you want to know what culture this idea came from, be a historian - I want to know what it means and what we can take from it, and how it connects to everything else - I am a sytematician, and of a very philosophical variety. Yet how must I balance the analytic tools with the intuitive sensibilities, considering the view that I have on the nature of truth? This is a question that I must constantly attune myself to, so that I can be making the most of these tools I have, keeping the blades sharp, and perhaps shaping new tools for myself if possible.
But there is also the framework of pragmatic use - one's mind does not function at its best at all moments. This involves a whole new set of questions: when I can use it - what times of day, where I can use it, how to make it carry on when it wants to shut down, and when to give up and relax for a time before trying again. Little things can become critically important - fasting days in Lent by necessity turn into days of fasting from work as the day goes on, for as my body does not receive its proper nourishment my mind turns to water. Sleep is enormously important for keeping a sharp edge to my thought, to swim with the current instead of being buried under ideas. Diet probably is important too - but ask Lisa about that, that's not my expertise. To be at my peak requires discipline in the activities I do - I know that starting the day with a passive entertainment form like a TV show will ruin my concentration for perhaps the whole day; I know that dawdling on the internet divorces me from this deeper mode of thought and concentration - a certain quality in the environment that is the deepest wellspring of thoughts. Of course, this place of deepest thought involves a steady pace and a concentration unhindered by what needs are being pressed upon me from the outside - this is often unhelpful for times when I need to be writing papers, for I must adapt myself to the needs of the day, not simply what I wish to think about.
I use myself almost as a third person, but in a way graduate studies can make of it a commodity, a detached objectification of your being - it is not only me, but my livelihood. But you see my point - the MA level is in part to get a preliminary understanding of the subject of theology, but it is largely to learn about yourself, whether you are capable and willing to move on to a doctoral program and devote the rest of your life to studies, to brave the risk of failing and having to start your life completely over if you find you can't be hired. This is a very real possibility that graduate students must face in this market. Graduate school is a real challenge to one's very self - we find how sharp our mind is, how far we can push ourselves, how much discouragement we must weather, and what kind of reward at the end is necessary to keep us going - if it is something outside of the joy that comes through learning and discovering both inside and outside of class, it probably is not enough to get us through. We're all asking ourselves, "Do I have what it takes to make it?" We all look up at our famous professors with a mix of awe and envy at times, hear success stories and hope that ours will some day sound the same. It can almost become a slavery - to ideas, to work, to this box that we are expected to fit inside.
It is a system we must understand and cooperate with, and yet keep ourselves detached and untamed by its easy categorizations. For, like all human structures, it bears the deep wounds of the fall, and can become a force antithetical to the dignity of the human person - ourselves, our peers, or those "outside."
"It's all in the balance," they say - find that balance. We must learn to be excellent teachers, excellent researchers, excellent writers, and excellent networkers. We must have an excellent grasp of the generals, and a solid specialization in particulars. We must work hard, but keep our sanity. We must work with the system, but never let it dominate us. I cannot help wondering if "balance" means to them "absolute perfection in everything we do" - but this is only another balance - to resist the vain pull of the spectral scholar-you-wish-you-were against the under- or overrated scholar-you-are-now, to find the scholar you may truly hope become -- and yet to not be too attached to this notion either.
Above all else, there is one aspect, one balance of this system in particular that greatly concerns me, especially in the field of theology or philosophy. But I will have to save this for another post. My paper is calling.
I have come to realize first, that it's not just about learning things. That's an undergraduate's job: absorb, learn, expand, wonder at the beautiful and marvelous world we live in! But real scholars do not simply listen - they speak and produce. That is for PhD students to worry about, mostly - producing journal articles and dissertations and conference papers.
At the MA level, you are caught in between. You must be open and listening, to get a broad base, and yet you must start to turn towards production. But in order to do so, there are many new frameworks one must take in; it is not just theology I am learning.
There is the framework of my discipline - theology is subdivided into fields, and these fields all have their own ways of speaking and thinking. I cannot speak like a systematician in a historical class; I must be sensitive to the approach and the questions that are being asked. (more on this for another post) So what kinds of questions must I be asking, what kinds of answers will people find helpful within the context of this field?
There is also the framework of my own mind. Many jobs are about simply doing things, and perhaps finding small ways to streamline your tasks to the ultimate goal, but the things you are modifying are tasks, protocols, stages, actions. To understand the process of graduate study is to come to know what this instrument is, this mind of mine, and how I can use it, and how I can't use it. There is first of all finding out how I think - in theology it is astonishingly easy to find one's sub-discipline simply by examining the nature of one's mental tools - what kinds of questions do you ask? If you want to know what culture this idea came from, be a historian - I want to know what it means and what we can take from it, and how it connects to everything else - I am a sytematician, and of a very philosophical variety. Yet how must I balance the analytic tools with the intuitive sensibilities, considering the view that I have on the nature of truth? This is a question that I must constantly attune myself to, so that I can be making the most of these tools I have, keeping the blades sharp, and perhaps shaping new tools for myself if possible.
But there is also the framework of pragmatic use - one's mind does not function at its best at all moments. This involves a whole new set of questions: when I can use it - what times of day, where I can use it, how to make it carry on when it wants to shut down, and when to give up and relax for a time before trying again. Little things can become critically important - fasting days in Lent by necessity turn into days of fasting from work as the day goes on, for as my body does not receive its proper nourishment my mind turns to water. Sleep is enormously important for keeping a sharp edge to my thought, to swim with the current instead of being buried under ideas. Diet probably is important too - but ask Lisa about that, that's not my expertise. To be at my peak requires discipline in the activities I do - I know that starting the day with a passive entertainment form like a TV show will ruin my concentration for perhaps the whole day; I know that dawdling on the internet divorces me from this deeper mode of thought and concentration - a certain quality in the environment that is the deepest wellspring of thoughts. Of course, this place of deepest thought involves a steady pace and a concentration unhindered by what needs are being pressed upon me from the outside - this is often unhelpful for times when I need to be writing papers, for I must adapt myself to the needs of the day, not simply what I wish to think about.
I use myself almost as a third person, but in a way graduate studies can make of it a commodity, a detached objectification of your being - it is not only me, but my livelihood. But you see my point - the MA level is in part to get a preliminary understanding of the subject of theology, but it is largely to learn about yourself, whether you are capable and willing to move on to a doctoral program and devote the rest of your life to studies, to brave the risk of failing and having to start your life completely over if you find you can't be hired. This is a very real possibility that graduate students must face in this market. Graduate school is a real challenge to one's very self - we find how sharp our mind is, how far we can push ourselves, how much discouragement we must weather, and what kind of reward at the end is necessary to keep us going - if it is something outside of the joy that comes through learning and discovering both inside and outside of class, it probably is not enough to get us through. We're all asking ourselves, "Do I have what it takes to make it?" We all look up at our famous professors with a mix of awe and envy at times, hear success stories and hope that ours will some day sound the same. It can almost become a slavery - to ideas, to work, to this box that we are expected to fit inside.
It is a system we must understand and cooperate with, and yet keep ourselves detached and untamed by its easy categorizations. For, like all human structures, it bears the deep wounds of the fall, and can become a force antithetical to the dignity of the human person - ourselves, our peers, or those "outside."
"It's all in the balance," they say - find that balance. We must learn to be excellent teachers, excellent researchers, excellent writers, and excellent networkers. We must have an excellent grasp of the generals, and a solid specialization in particulars. We must work hard, but keep our sanity. We must work with the system, but never let it dominate us. I cannot help wondering if "balance" means to them "absolute perfection in everything we do" - but this is only another balance - to resist the vain pull of the spectral scholar-you-wish-you-were against the under- or overrated scholar-you-are-now, to find the scholar you may truly hope become -- and yet to not be too attached to this notion either.
Above all else, there is one aspect, one balance of this system in particular that greatly concerns me, especially in the field of theology or philosophy. But I will have to save this for another post. My paper is calling.
Thursday, February 25, 2010
Trinity and Creation
A sketch of thoughts touching upon earlier posts on mediation and multiplicity...
"It is not possible to overemphasize the positive value of the multiplicity of creatures: Thomas conceives of the plurality of creatures as a participation in the Trinity. Personal relation - the principle of distinction within the Trinity - is seen to be the ultimate source of creation and the principle of all plurality in our world."
-David Burrell
The multiplicity of existing things didn't make sense for Neo-Platonism. The One, the goodness beyond being, "the One in no way many," was perfectly self-sufficient, unchanging, and so perfectly simple that any proposition attached to it was nonsense - to say "The One is true" is to posit the One as both "The One" and "true", now two and not one, destroying its simplicity. Even to say "The One is One" is to posit similarity in the One, thus making it both "The One" and "similarity". (This is because for Plato, a thing participates in the forms to receive its nature - something is beautiful because it participates in Beauty, etc. saying the One is true is to say the One participates in the form of Truth. No, Plato does not put the forms as ideas in the mind of God - the One doesn't have a mind... as the One. Hold that thought.)
This utterly simple One, therefore, could not have a will, so solely through the superabundant nature of goodness, it emanated forth in Nous, or Mind, which "unrolled" from the One "as if in a drunken stupor." But Nous did not create the world directly either - when Nous turns back to the One in thought, it thinks the multiplicity of ideas in the world (the Forms), which gives rise to the world soul (where our souls exist). The world soul, finally comes to rest and give order to the undifferentiated (pre-existing) matter. (Creation ex nihilo is an original Christian idea.) So I become me when the world soul gives a heap of undifferentiated matter the forms of Human and Woman and Nerd, etc. (More or less, this is the Neo-Platonic system.)
But the Trinity is not a "One in no way many": the Trinity is a One in Three Persons. Not only does this differentiation in God allow creation to be an act of free will, but it also is responsible for diffracting this triune-unity into the multiplicity of creation.
So MULTIPLICITY is a fundamentally Trinitarian phenomenon.
MEDIATION, however, is also Neo-Platonic. Hmm... I wonder what that means. But this is nothing new - Stoicism took up the idea of Nous, but named it Logos, and this is precisely what John had in mind when he wrote his gospel, and what tripped up Arius and many early Christian thinkers - isn't the Word just an inferior mediation of God? Etc. etc.
But in Neo-Platonism, in which every emanation is a further removed diffraction from its source - the farther removed you get, the more multiplicity you get. To return to the Nous you abandon all discursive reasoning, but to get to the One you have to "close the eye of the intellect" altogether - this is to abandon the mediation of things, of words, of reason, even intuitive knowledge - just to be utterly silent.
For Trinitarian theology, on the other hand, Christ as Logos means that he is not only the mediation, HE IS THE THING ITSELF.
When I say a word to you, you hear the word, and then process the idea to get the truth of my revelation of myself.
When God says a word to you, he GIVES HIMSELF.
The mediation of Christ is special.
In fact, I think we can talk about it in three, or maybe 4 ways, depending on whether you think the Incarnation is necessary to metaphysics (Bonaventure) or not (Aquinas).
1) Creation through the Logos.
2) Historical Encounter with the person who is Incarnation of the Logos.
3) the Incarnation's transformation of creation
4) our mediation with each other after deification (by which we come to union with the divine nathre)
(1 and 3 would be the same for Bonaventure - Creation was always through the Logos who would be Incarnate. It might be the same for Aquinas too... this gets into the different kinds of necessary actions of the Trinity - was Logos eternally going to become Incarnate since God is outside of time, even if he didn't necessarily HAVE to become Incarnate? That gets complicated. So maybe 1 and 3 are the same for Aquinas too in practice. In theory, though, they could be separated: what would creation be like if the Logos was not to-be-Incarnate? How does that change once the Logos was Incarnate?)
Next step of exploration, specifically through 1/3: Analogia entis - the analogy of being.
"It is not possible to overemphasize the positive value of the multiplicity of creatures: Thomas conceives of the plurality of creatures as a participation in the Trinity. Personal relation - the principle of distinction within the Trinity - is seen to be the ultimate source of creation and the principle of all plurality in our world."
-David Burrell
The multiplicity of existing things didn't make sense for Neo-Platonism. The One, the goodness beyond being, "the One in no way many," was perfectly self-sufficient, unchanging, and so perfectly simple that any proposition attached to it was nonsense - to say "The One is true" is to posit the One as both "The One" and "true", now two and not one, destroying its simplicity. Even to say "The One is One" is to posit similarity in the One, thus making it both "The One" and "similarity". (This is because for Plato, a thing participates in the forms to receive its nature - something is beautiful because it participates in Beauty, etc. saying the One is true is to say the One participates in the form of Truth. No, Plato does not put the forms as ideas in the mind of God - the One doesn't have a mind... as the One. Hold that thought.)
This utterly simple One, therefore, could not have a will, so solely through the superabundant nature of goodness, it emanated forth in Nous, or Mind, which "unrolled" from the One "as if in a drunken stupor." But Nous did not create the world directly either - when Nous turns back to the One in thought, it thinks the multiplicity of ideas in the world (the Forms), which gives rise to the world soul (where our souls exist). The world soul, finally comes to rest and give order to the undifferentiated (pre-existing) matter. (Creation ex nihilo is an original Christian idea.) So I become me when the world soul gives a heap of undifferentiated matter the forms of Human and Woman and Nerd, etc. (More or less, this is the Neo-Platonic system.)
But the Trinity is not a "One in no way many": the Trinity is a One in Three Persons. Not only does this differentiation in God allow creation to be an act of free will, but it also is responsible for diffracting this triune-unity into the multiplicity of creation.
So MULTIPLICITY is a fundamentally Trinitarian phenomenon.
MEDIATION, however, is also Neo-Platonic. Hmm... I wonder what that means. But this is nothing new - Stoicism took up the idea of Nous, but named it Logos, and this is precisely what John had in mind when he wrote his gospel, and what tripped up Arius and many early Christian thinkers - isn't the Word just an inferior mediation of God? Etc. etc.
But in Neo-Platonism, in which every emanation is a further removed diffraction from its source - the farther removed you get, the more multiplicity you get. To return to the Nous you abandon all discursive reasoning, but to get to the One you have to "close the eye of the intellect" altogether - this is to abandon the mediation of things, of words, of reason, even intuitive knowledge - just to be utterly silent.
For Trinitarian theology, on the other hand, Christ as Logos means that he is not only the mediation, HE IS THE THING ITSELF.
When I say a word to you, you hear the word, and then process the idea to get the truth of my revelation of myself.
When God says a word to you, he GIVES HIMSELF.
The mediation of Christ is special.
In fact, I think we can talk about it in three, or maybe 4 ways, depending on whether you think the Incarnation is necessary to metaphysics (Bonaventure) or not (Aquinas).
1) Creation through the Logos.
2) Historical Encounter with the person who is Incarnation of the Logos.
3) the Incarnation's transformation of creation
4) our mediation with each other after deification (by which we come to union with the divine nathre)
(1 and 3 would be the same for Bonaventure - Creation was always through the Logos who would be Incarnate. It might be the same for Aquinas too... this gets into the different kinds of necessary actions of the Trinity - was Logos eternally going to become Incarnate since God is outside of time, even if he didn't necessarily HAVE to become Incarnate? That gets complicated. So maybe 1 and 3 are the same for Aquinas too in practice. In theory, though, they could be separated: what would creation be like if the Logos was not to-be-Incarnate? How does that change once the Logos was Incarnate?)
Next step of exploration, specifically through 1/3: Analogia entis - the analogy of being.
Friday, February 5, 2010
Death, a Footnote
Central what I am trying to say is this, I think:
Truth cannot be separated from goodness and beauty. They are three faces of the same thing.
If I knew more von Balthasar I would be able to say more about this.
And now a brief patchwork of quotes:
In modern scholarship, "analytic philosophers had defined the central task of philosophy as that of deciphering the meaning of key expressions in both everyday and scientific language" -Alasdair MacIntyre
Compared to a more full understanding...
"In every truth there is something more than we would have expected, in the love that we receive there is always an element that surprises us. We should never cease to marvel at these things."
-Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate
"The intelligence only grows and bears fruit in joy. The joy of learning is as indispensable in study as breathing is in running.... It is the part played by joy in our studies that makes of them a preparation for spiritual life, for desire directed toward God is the only power capable of raising the soul. "
-Simone Weil, Reflections on the Right Use of School Studies to Love God
“Poetic knowledge does not in itself tend toward love, any more, for that matter, than scientific knowledge; but… all knowledge which is not finally turned toward loving is by that very fact a source of death.”
-Raïssa Maritain, The Situation of Poetry
No conclusions, just a few more thoughts.
Truth cannot be separated from goodness and beauty. They are three faces of the same thing.
If I knew more von Balthasar I would be able to say more about this.
And now a brief patchwork of quotes:
In modern scholarship, "analytic philosophers had defined the central task of philosophy as that of deciphering the meaning of key expressions in both everyday and scientific language" -Alasdair MacIntyre
Compared to a more full understanding...
"In every truth there is something more than we would have expected, in the love that we receive there is always an element that surprises us. We should never cease to marvel at these things."
-Benedict XVI, Caritas in Veritate
"The intelligence only grows and bears fruit in joy. The joy of learning is as indispensable in study as breathing is in running.... It is the part played by joy in our studies that makes of them a preparation for spiritual life, for desire directed toward God is the only power capable of raising the soul. "
-Simone Weil, Reflections on the Right Use of School Studies to Love God
“Poetic knowledge does not in itself tend toward love, any more, for that matter, than scientific knowledge; but… all knowledge which is not finally turned toward loving is by that very fact a source of death.”
-Raïssa Maritain, The Situation of Poetry
No conclusions, just a few more thoughts.
Death
I haven't been blogging. I have for too long been suffering from a kind of "theological aphasia" (to quote a thinker more clever than I). Well, not suffering, exactly - having an overabundance of ideas is a good thing, right? Thoughts upon thoughts, which, when grasped, lead to even more thoughts and more - never ending tangles of vines with no clear beginning, and through my studies I have learned just enough to see that I have not learned nearly enough - I have neither the tools, the time, nor the energy to harvest any fruit. (And thus I apologize in advance that I am here writing to find my problems rather to answer anything.)
But more recently, dense vegetation of thoughts upon thoughts has given way to strange expanses of a much sparser, scrubbier underbrush. I don't see any signs of disease or plague, exactly, no violence or force - yet the creativity of dense thoughts seem to be dying out, weakening, becoming thin and scrawny.
I think I know the cause - it is a very strange thing, something I never saw coming. Philosophy, it seems, is a source of death.
Strange, I know. And strange that I of all people should say such a thing. But somehow, it stands true - philosophy, among its relations to many things, stands within a strange, dark shadow.
Where do I begin to unpack this strange impression? Perhaps right from our common definitions.
Death is the separation of soul from body.
Philosophy is a separation, an abstraction (from the latin ab-straho, to cut away) of form from matter, universal from particular, an intelligible from sensible.
Other epistemologies would alter this definition, of course, but I do not wish to question how we know, but the fact of what does happen when we know, or reason very carefully - that essential principle which remains the same. There is a certain separation that goes on whereby we take an sense experience and drain its vibrant color away into an abstract ghost of its former self.
In a way, once again, this all returns to mediation vs. immediacy - to be a human being, to live a rational life, we must operate through mediation - we must distance ourselves from the world in order to make sense of it. (and what is that, anyway? sense? Really, what does meaning mean? But I will never find my way out of that labyrinth). If we didn't, we would all be infants, as Lonergan observes, unable to distinguish ourselves from any other object in the world.
But philosophy is not just an "ordinary" level of mediation - it is a reflection on a reflection on a reflection, removing itself from reality in fractal spirals. (I said reality. I don't really mean that. Reality is too ill-defined of a concept when speaking generally - perhaps I mean here experience.) This is more than a normal exercise of human reason, which stands apart from the world just enough to appreciate and understand it. Philosophy removes the intellect from the sensible experience; the soul operates as far apart from matter as it can. A gradation of death.
I have stated my case strongly, but now I must qualify: "as far apart from matter as it can." The anthropology of Aquinas is the one my mind most often slips into - the one I understand best. So according to Aquinas, an intelligible is something immaterial, and therefore must be grasped by an immaterial faculty. This is none other than human intellect, although it cannot operate except through the use of the senses to gather this information, and helps knowledge with imagination and memory. (Tangent: the soul needs the body to form images - even memories, yes? I always thought we would have only our memories when we die, even if no way to gain more knowledge until we have our bodies back. Hm. This is a problem.) We might not want to take this all the way, but at the very least, we would say that the soul is farthest removed from the body when it is focused on very abstract ideas that make little or no use of images or memories.
I will also add: emotion. The soul is farthest removed from the body when there is no emotion acting, since all emotion has a physical component.
Why do I say all emotion has a physical component but that thought does not? Really, I am cheating now, and using modern science for one thing and medieval metaphysics for the other. Maybe scientifically all thoughts need a physical platform too. But no - we must have some kind of thought, with emotion or not, that is possible without a body. Or at least such a thing is possible in angelic reason. However I am disturbed if I have just made angels to be products of pure thought. This sounds way too Kantian and Reason-worshipping to be true. Angels MUST be moved by beauty somehow - e-motion, ex-motus - "having been moved out" - love cannot be complete without this. Love is not pure agape - it is agape and eros. They don't need to have bodily emotions in the same way - but they need to have some irresistible draw to the Beautiful, whose other name is the True or the Good.
Or could it be that the farthest apart a soul can be from matter is not abstract thought, but contemplative prayer. Can I say that? I might be wrong. But many saints do have ecstatic appearances, no longer notice the passage of time, fail to notice or have control over their body, they have infused knowledge or grace (like the angels immediately intuit truth I might add), etc - it seems that God is directly touching the spirit. (This would seem to find a rough harmony with Neo-Platonism and its two flights of contemplation, of philosophy and mysticism: the goal of first being to free the soul as far as possible from the concerns of the body and even all discursive reasoning to a level of pure concept in communion with the Nous, the Intellect; the goal of the second to rise beyond this to commune in a truly apophatic and mystical way with the One Beyond All Being.)
This leads to a problem: why would God, if he intends the resurrection of the dead, only touch only the spirit and leave the body out of glorification? I am not an expert in contemplative prayer - but now I remember something else. St. Teresa of Avila does assure some of her spiritual directees that they should not be disturbed if they experience sexual pleasure during contemplation - whether this is common or rare I do not know, but the fact that such a thing exists means that the body can also participate in the pure joy that comes through contemplation, so it is, in the end, a HUMAN, EMBODIED, and not angelic experience (and therefore no longer Neo-Platonic dualism). So perhaps contemplative prayer is not, after all, a death.
Then again: it is an enormous sign of death to self. It is participation on earth in union with God - it is a death to the old self and a rising again in Christ. Is the death of crucifixion a death as well? Separation of soul and body? Certainly, our bodies are fallen, and we must separate from the sinful passions. (With Paul we often cry "Who will rescue me from this body of death?") But our souls are fallen as well - pride, the root of all sins, is primarily a spiritual evil, more grave than imprudently obeying the pull of a natural instinct. So let's not become Manichean. Perhaps then we need to alter our definition of death. We need to die to ourselves, not our bodies - we need to be separated from all that is not God.
So what have I gotten myself into?
Death: the ultimate separation of soul from body.
Death: the ultimate separation of our whole selves, soul+body, from all that is sinful in us; also, the ultimate union with God and only God though and in all things.
Death: abstraction of intelligible thought from sensible data? removing the self from experience? Philosophy?
Aphasia. Too much to say. I don't know how to express it except in these stuttering tangential pieces that do not cohere and I know they don't cohere - there must be a coherence somewhere. Perhaps the more pieces I stutter out, the more things will slowly unfold. Or perhaps not.
I will say this: I used to think that it was a coincidence that very cold, rationalistic people became philosophers (Immanuael Kant). Now I think that philosophy can make one to become that way.
This seems harsh. But when Pilate's question, rings out, so human, so disillusioned, yet so childlike, "What is truth?" philosophy would hand him a snake: "And this, then is three True: the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself," says Hegel. (A far cry from Plato and his analogy of the cave - but that will be for another post - that philosophy used to be a way of life, and trying to make it into a scientific, academic discipline seems to have neutered it and cut out its heart.)
Not philosophy alone, either - linguistics is also a death - we strip away the meanings, strip away the words, strip away the endings, all to a bare abstract skeleton of the living language - we gut it, neatly arrange its intestines, drain the excess fluid - although we never are able to view its beating heart. And the more linguists study, the less they are able to see language alive - they kill it, analyze it, whenever they come across it. (There are always so many former linguistics majors - they want to learn because they love the language alive, but they find that they cannot bear the science of its constant death.) Some of my old professors confess they no longer enjoy novels because they can't stop themselves from dissecting every sentence.
Is there an escape? Is this the way it must be? Linguistics is one thing - it is just a human science after all. But ought this to be the case in philosophy? Perhaps if your philosophy is firmly rooted in the WHOLE human person - body and soul, reason and emotion. But can philosophy, as a science, deal with emotion? Or does reason necessarily have an emotional component? Of what kind of relation? Perhaps the same relation as concepts are supported by words?
This is the huge problem in Lonergan. This is a huge problem in Kant. This is a huge problem in very many philosophers, and it is a very huge problem for me. My thoughts are dying when I try to become too philosophical - when I want to become precise and exact and pin things down in reason that is precisely when they all slip away from me and become shadows and ghosts of the reality I want to describe. I think part of it has to do with the isolation of reason from emotion - this distinction is not really human, and doesn't really describe life. Ought we really to be training ourselves to think in a way that does not confront our real experience, but only a ghost of it?
But what else ought philosophy to be? Thomas Aquinas says "Philosophers and poets are alike in being big with wonder" - well, if one thinks coldly rational, abstract thoughts all day, this kills wonder. So there are two options: either a scholar must be careful to supplement this in his life with poetry or this is not philosophy.
Is it that philosophy deals with the whole human person, as a being of body and matter, reason and emotion while using ONLY reason as a tool?
Or is it that we really can't do human philosophy if we fully separate reason from emotion, just like we can't really be human and fully separate soul from body?
The implications of this could cause major problems, I know. Classical philosophy wants to escape from the body. Phenomenology might or might not have the equipment to deal with it. Analytic philosophy assuredly does not.
I don't know if I succeeded in expressing my point, and with the continual shifting of my underlying assumptions, I'm sure I've gestured at many wrong many paths in the above… I do not mean to say that scientific thinking is evil or that we should return to a naive simplicity; philosophy is hard work, not bouquets of roses, and even if tainted with death I do not see death as the ultimate evil. I am merely trying to capture, in broad impressionistic strokes, something I think is very real, and, whatever its real name or ultimate solution may be, it is a great danger for those thinkers whose minds do not come with an "off" switch.
But more recently, dense vegetation of thoughts upon thoughts has given way to strange expanses of a much sparser, scrubbier underbrush. I don't see any signs of disease or plague, exactly, no violence or force - yet the creativity of dense thoughts seem to be dying out, weakening, becoming thin and scrawny.
I think I know the cause - it is a very strange thing, something I never saw coming. Philosophy, it seems, is a source of death.
Strange, I know. And strange that I of all people should say such a thing. But somehow, it stands true - philosophy, among its relations to many things, stands within a strange, dark shadow.
Where do I begin to unpack this strange impression? Perhaps right from our common definitions.
Death is the separation of soul from body.
Philosophy is a separation, an abstraction (from the latin ab-straho, to cut away) of form from matter, universal from particular, an intelligible from sensible.
Other epistemologies would alter this definition, of course, but I do not wish to question how we know, but the fact of what does happen when we know, or reason very carefully - that essential principle which remains the same. There is a certain separation that goes on whereby we take an sense experience and drain its vibrant color away into an abstract ghost of its former self.
In a way, once again, this all returns to mediation vs. immediacy - to be a human being, to live a rational life, we must operate through mediation - we must distance ourselves from the world in order to make sense of it. (and what is that, anyway? sense? Really, what does meaning mean? But I will never find my way out of that labyrinth). If we didn't, we would all be infants, as Lonergan observes, unable to distinguish ourselves from any other object in the world.
But philosophy is not just an "ordinary" level of mediation - it is a reflection on a reflection on a reflection, removing itself from reality in fractal spirals. (I said reality. I don't really mean that. Reality is too ill-defined of a concept when speaking generally - perhaps I mean here experience.) This is more than a normal exercise of human reason, which stands apart from the world just enough to appreciate and understand it. Philosophy removes the intellect from the sensible experience; the soul operates as far apart from matter as it can. A gradation of death.
I have stated my case strongly, but now I must qualify: "as far apart from matter as it can." The anthropology of Aquinas is the one my mind most often slips into - the one I understand best. So according to Aquinas, an intelligible is something immaterial, and therefore must be grasped by an immaterial faculty. This is none other than human intellect, although it cannot operate except through the use of the senses to gather this information, and helps knowledge with imagination and memory. (Tangent: the soul needs the body to form images - even memories, yes? I always thought we would have only our memories when we die, even if no way to gain more knowledge until we have our bodies back. Hm. This is a problem.) We might not want to take this all the way, but at the very least, we would say that the soul is farthest removed from the body when it is focused on very abstract ideas that make little or no use of images or memories.
I will also add: emotion. The soul is farthest removed from the body when there is no emotion acting, since all emotion has a physical component.
Why do I say all emotion has a physical component but that thought does not? Really, I am cheating now, and using modern science for one thing and medieval metaphysics for the other. Maybe scientifically all thoughts need a physical platform too. But no - we must have some kind of thought, with emotion or not, that is possible without a body. Or at least such a thing is possible in angelic reason. However I am disturbed if I have just made angels to be products of pure thought. This sounds way too Kantian and Reason-worshipping to be true. Angels MUST be moved by beauty somehow - e-motion, ex-motus - "having been moved out" - love cannot be complete without this. Love is not pure agape - it is agape and eros. They don't need to have bodily emotions in the same way - but they need to have some irresistible draw to the Beautiful, whose other name is the True or the Good.
Or could it be that the farthest apart a soul can be from matter is not abstract thought, but contemplative prayer. Can I say that? I might be wrong. But many saints do have ecstatic appearances, no longer notice the passage of time, fail to notice or have control over their body, they have infused knowledge or grace (like the angels immediately intuit truth I might add), etc - it seems that God is directly touching the spirit. (This would seem to find a rough harmony with Neo-Platonism and its two flights of contemplation, of philosophy and mysticism: the goal of first being to free the soul as far as possible from the concerns of the body and even all discursive reasoning to a level of pure concept in communion with the Nous, the Intellect; the goal of the second to rise beyond this to commune in a truly apophatic and mystical way with the One Beyond All Being.)
This leads to a problem: why would God, if he intends the resurrection of the dead, only touch only the spirit and leave the body out of glorification? I am not an expert in contemplative prayer - but now I remember something else. St. Teresa of Avila does assure some of her spiritual directees that they should not be disturbed if they experience sexual pleasure during contemplation - whether this is common or rare I do not know, but the fact that such a thing exists means that the body can also participate in the pure joy that comes through contemplation, so it is, in the end, a HUMAN, EMBODIED, and not angelic experience (and therefore no longer Neo-Platonic dualism). So perhaps contemplative prayer is not, after all, a death.
Then again: it is an enormous sign of death to self. It is participation on earth in union with God - it is a death to the old self and a rising again in Christ. Is the death of crucifixion a death as well? Separation of soul and body? Certainly, our bodies are fallen, and we must separate from the sinful passions. (With Paul we often cry "Who will rescue me from this body of death?") But our souls are fallen as well - pride, the root of all sins, is primarily a spiritual evil, more grave than imprudently obeying the pull of a natural instinct. So let's not become Manichean. Perhaps then we need to alter our definition of death. We need to die to ourselves, not our bodies - we need to be separated from all that is not God.
So what have I gotten myself into?
Death: the ultimate separation of soul from body.
Death: the ultimate separation of our whole selves, soul+body, from all that is sinful in us; also, the ultimate union with God and only God though and in all things.
Death: abstraction of intelligible thought from sensible data? removing the self from experience? Philosophy?
Aphasia. Too much to say. I don't know how to express it except in these stuttering tangential pieces that do not cohere and I know they don't cohere - there must be a coherence somewhere. Perhaps the more pieces I stutter out, the more things will slowly unfold. Or perhaps not.
I will say this: I used to think that it was a coincidence that very cold, rationalistic people became philosophers (Immanuael Kant). Now I think that philosophy can make one to become that way.
This seems harsh. But when Pilate's question, rings out, so human, so disillusioned, yet so childlike, "What is truth?" philosophy would hand him a snake: "And this, then is three True: the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself," says Hegel. (A far cry from Plato and his analogy of the cave - but that will be for another post - that philosophy used to be a way of life, and trying to make it into a scientific, academic discipline seems to have neutered it and cut out its heart.)
Not philosophy alone, either - linguistics is also a death - we strip away the meanings, strip away the words, strip away the endings, all to a bare abstract skeleton of the living language - we gut it, neatly arrange its intestines, drain the excess fluid - although we never are able to view its beating heart. And the more linguists study, the less they are able to see language alive - they kill it, analyze it, whenever they come across it. (There are always so many former linguistics majors - they want to learn because they love the language alive, but they find that they cannot bear the science of its constant death.) Some of my old professors confess they no longer enjoy novels because they can't stop themselves from dissecting every sentence.
Is there an escape? Is this the way it must be? Linguistics is one thing - it is just a human science after all. But ought this to be the case in philosophy? Perhaps if your philosophy is firmly rooted in the WHOLE human person - body and soul, reason and emotion. But can philosophy, as a science, deal with emotion? Or does reason necessarily have an emotional component? Of what kind of relation? Perhaps the same relation as concepts are supported by words?
This is the huge problem in Lonergan. This is a huge problem in Kant. This is a huge problem in very many philosophers, and it is a very huge problem for me. My thoughts are dying when I try to become too philosophical - when I want to become precise and exact and pin things down in reason that is precisely when they all slip away from me and become shadows and ghosts of the reality I want to describe. I think part of it has to do with the isolation of reason from emotion - this distinction is not really human, and doesn't really describe life. Ought we really to be training ourselves to think in a way that does not confront our real experience, but only a ghost of it?
But what else ought philosophy to be? Thomas Aquinas says "Philosophers and poets are alike in being big with wonder" - well, if one thinks coldly rational, abstract thoughts all day, this kills wonder. So there are two options: either a scholar must be careful to supplement this in his life with poetry or this is not philosophy.
Is it that philosophy deals with the whole human person, as a being of body and matter, reason and emotion while using ONLY reason as a tool?
Or is it that we really can't do human philosophy if we fully separate reason from emotion, just like we can't really be human and fully separate soul from body?
The implications of this could cause major problems, I know. Classical philosophy wants to escape from the body. Phenomenology might or might not have the equipment to deal with it. Analytic philosophy assuredly does not.
I don't know if I succeeded in expressing my point, and with the continual shifting of my underlying assumptions, I'm sure I've gestured at many wrong many paths in the above… I do not mean to say that scientific thinking is evil or that we should return to a naive simplicity; philosophy is hard work, not bouquets of roses, and even if tainted with death I do not see death as the ultimate evil. I am merely trying to capture, in broad impressionistic strokes, something I think is very real, and, whatever its real name or ultimate solution may be, it is a great danger for those thinkers whose minds do not come with an "off" switch.
Thursday, December 10, 2009
Advent
We all think of the truest kind of love as a self-gift to others.
I wonder if it might be truer, at least for us human creatures, to say even before this, the a more fundamental love is to freely accept the gift.
What gift? Any gift? Any true gift - any true outpouring of anther's self, WITHOUT exchange, WITHOUT repayment, or even the possibility - yes, even WITHOUT the ability to truly express your thanks. To simply receive the gift.
To accept this kind of gift: this is love. Perhaps the most difficult kind.
We do not want to accept this gift. It is too hard for us. We turn it down saying others need it more, we make it into an exchange or try to pay it back--anything to cast it on to someone else, anything to hide from the fact that the gift is FREE, that it is not based on any merit or action of ours. The truth is, deep down inside, it is not about responsibility at all; that is a mask of "adultness" we wear because we are too ashamed to face the real reason: because we believe we are failures. The gift gazes deep into the darkest parts of our soul, sees who we are not yet should be; we are not worthy that another person should give to us their love. And so we plead with Peter, "Lord, depart from me, for I am a sinful man!" But here is the truth: if this is where we start, we will never be worthy. We cannot spend our lives waiting to be worthy.
So. Now. The gift is near, the greatest gift beyond all hope, beyond all imagination. He does not ask us to prove our devotion, to run spiritual marathons to merit him; if this were the case the world would be lost in the dark winter of sin forever. All he asks is that we let him come to us; he is the radiant warmth of dawn, and he will become our love, if we only let him; he will join the tiny ungrateful trickle from our hearts with the surging ocean of the divine. Will we receive him? Will we let his light wash away the cobwebs from our hearts? Will we let up our own need for worthiness to accept this freest gift of love?
I wonder if it might be truer, at least for us human creatures, to say even before this, the a more fundamental love is to freely accept the gift.
What gift? Any gift? Any true gift - any true outpouring of anther's self, WITHOUT exchange, WITHOUT repayment, or even the possibility - yes, even WITHOUT the ability to truly express your thanks. To simply receive the gift.
To accept this kind of gift: this is love. Perhaps the most difficult kind.
We do not want to accept this gift. It is too hard for us. We turn it down saying others need it more, we make it into an exchange or try to pay it back--anything to cast it on to someone else, anything to hide from the fact that the gift is FREE, that it is not based on any merit or action of ours. The truth is, deep down inside, it is not about responsibility at all; that is a mask of "adultness" we wear because we are too ashamed to face the real reason: because we believe we are failures. The gift gazes deep into the darkest parts of our soul, sees who we are not yet should be; we are not worthy that another person should give to us their love. And so we plead with Peter, "Lord, depart from me, for I am a sinful man!" But here is the truth: if this is where we start, we will never be worthy. We cannot spend our lives waiting to be worthy.
So. Now. The gift is near, the greatest gift beyond all hope, beyond all imagination. He does not ask us to prove our devotion, to run spiritual marathons to merit him; if this were the case the world would be lost in the dark winter of sin forever. All he asks is that we let him come to us; he is the radiant warmth of dawn, and he will become our love, if we only let him; he will join the tiny ungrateful trickle from our hearts with the surging ocean of the divine. Will we receive him? Will we let his light wash away the cobwebs from our hearts? Will we let up our own need for worthiness to accept this freest gift of love?
Friday, November 13, 2009
Thoughts from the East
As I have pondered these issues, my assigned reading over the past few weeks has seemed directly aimed at their answer, through John of Damascus, Symeon the New Theologian, and Gregory Palamas, three great saints of the Eastern Church, in addition to good old Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. You will have to forgive, one again, my scattered musings - If I try for anything more I become too daunted by my task, realizing I am not uncovering mere human concepts, but divine fractals spiraling outward and inward for all of infinity!
First of all, I realized my problem was really a simple one, if I traced it far enough: if the issue is mediation through finite creatures, the question is really not "Why do we not have direct access to truth and God?" but "Why is there a multiplicity of forms to begin with?" Or less philosophically, "Why have creation at all?"
For now I will merely say a little about these theologians. Perhaps my own opinion belongs to another post.
St. John of Damascus is most famous for his contribution to the philosophical foundations of Scholasticism, but also for his defense of icons against the first iconoclastic controversy in the eighth century. And really, a defense against icons is not about preserving a perfectly innocent tradition from unjust condemnation, or the illicit role of the emperor in trying to control the Church; the real agenda of a philosophy of iconoclasm is summed up in a two part question: "Why should the material world be an avenue for knowledge of God or of our sanctification?" and "What is the importance of creatures at all?" (Now, I am no iconoclast: I asked my questions of earlier posts not to say that I felt that mediation is necessarily a bad thing; I was simply wondering why it should be that way.) The first question deals with the human being as being an embodied soul, and the second deals with the importance of saints as intercessors and especially as examples. As bodies, we need the material to communicate - self-explanatory enough. But interesting that St. John should place so much emphasis on the glory due to saints - the glory due to saints is due for the sake of Christ, who dwells in them - creation, at its most perfect, especially though Mary, becomes a dwelling place for God. So somehow the fact that there even is a multiplicity of forms at all, which was not necessary, now demands then that we should need mediation, not just one of communicating an understanding through bodily matter, but that God mediate himself through conscious matter; there is a different between the way a piece of carved marble and a thinking mind communicate God's presence; God dwells in each, but through the Incarnation, God took on man's nature so that man might take on God's - we truly participate in divine nature, "deification", as it is called in the Greek tradition.
Symeon and Gregory Palamas speak extensively of this, but in a particularly contemplative vein. They both come from the Eastern Mystical tradition, the "hesychast" movement, which seeks union with God in inner stillness of heart, a state reached usually by repetition of the Jesus prayer. Symeon says that if we purify ourselves, through the gift of divine grace, we can *really* have experience of God on this earth - it will not just be the gathered vestiges of his touch in creation, but we will *really* experience God. (Part of this is only possible through the Eastern understanding of the Trinity which keeps the Divine Essence a mystery, but allows us to fully understand his Energies acting in the world, as opposed to the Western knowledge, which says any "Energy" or attribute we can give to God (Love, Goodness, etc) is fully undifferentiated from "Essence", and so complete knowledge of God is only possible through beholding his Essence, something that can happen only in the beatific vision... but that's really beyond the scope of what I am able to discuss here.) As Fr. John pointed out in my philosophy class, observe Rublev's icon here of the Transfiguration: the light on the mountain was not mere created light, as shown in Raphael's painting (fully consonant with the Western method of reaching God through natural epistemology); the light is a divine, uncreated light, illuminating all and casting no shadows, even while Christ himself is also surrounded by a cloud of mystery. Defending Symeon, Palamas adds that we do experience the divine through our own senses, although not through any power of their own; God grants them additional supernatural powers so that the divine glory may be perceived through the eyes, as the disciples *saw* Christ becoming transfigured before them (although not that he changed; simply that their eyes were opened to the glory of God by supernatural gift).
This is the highly condensed form of part of my thought on part of the issue. Questions left that still need whole books to answer:
-why something rather than nothing? why should things spill over, from nothing into something, from our thoughts to others, charity itself being a spilling over and gift of our very self - what can we say about this Divine fruitfulness that leaves its traces in all creation, and in what ways?
-the way humans communicate through matter
-the ontological differences of mind and matter
-the way that a mind participates in mediation, both receiving and sending forth
-how the Incarnation, as God's word to us, gives us some license to mediate*
-what happens to non-human minds (i.e. angels) whose nature God did not assume
-what constitutes divine illumination, such that purification should be necessary to receive it (if it makes sense to talk about that)
-how Western mystics, without a distinction between Essence/Energies, can talk about union with God
-how what the mystics say is related to us "ordinary people," who either are not called, or not listening their call to such union
-what is meaning in general, anyway?
I could think of so many more. Do you understand how difficult it is to even look at such a dazzling saturation, much less blog on it?
*You'll notice I did not, in fact, write on the Incarnation in this post. That is too daunting and hard.
First of all, I realized my problem was really a simple one, if I traced it far enough: if the issue is mediation through finite creatures, the question is really not "Why do we not have direct access to truth and God?" but "Why is there a multiplicity of forms to begin with?" Or less philosophically, "Why have creation at all?"
For now I will merely say a little about these theologians. Perhaps my own opinion belongs to another post.
St. John of Damascus is most famous for his contribution to the philosophical foundations of Scholasticism, but also for his defense of icons against the first iconoclastic controversy in the eighth century. And really, a defense against icons is not about preserving a perfectly innocent tradition from unjust condemnation, or the illicit role of the emperor in trying to control the Church; the real agenda of a philosophy of iconoclasm is summed up in a two part question: "Why should the material world be an avenue for knowledge of God or of our sanctification?" and "What is the importance of creatures at all?" (Now, I am no iconoclast: I asked my questions of earlier posts not to say that I felt that mediation is necessarily a bad thing; I was simply wondering why it should be that way.) The first question deals with the human being as being an embodied soul, and the second deals with the importance of saints as intercessors and especially as examples. As bodies, we need the material to communicate - self-explanatory enough. But interesting that St. John should place so much emphasis on the glory due to saints - the glory due to saints is due for the sake of Christ, who dwells in them - creation, at its most perfect, especially though Mary, becomes a dwelling place for God. So somehow the fact that there even is a multiplicity of forms at all, which was not necessary, now demands then that we should need mediation, not just one of communicating an understanding through bodily matter, but that God mediate himself through conscious matter; there is a different between the way a piece of carved marble and a thinking mind communicate God's presence; God dwells in each, but through the Incarnation, God took on man's nature so that man might take on God's - we truly participate in divine nature, "deification", as it is called in the Greek tradition.
Symeon and Gregory Palamas speak extensively of this, but in a particularly contemplative vein. They both come from the Eastern Mystical tradition, the "hesychast" movement, which seeks union with God in inner stillness of heart, a state reached usually by repetition of the Jesus prayer. Symeon says that if we purify ourselves, through the gift of divine grace, we can *really* have experience of God on this earth - it will not just be the gathered vestiges of his touch in creation, but we will *really* experience God. (Part of this is only possible through the Eastern understanding of the Trinity which keeps the Divine Essence a mystery, but allows us to fully understand his Energies acting in the world, as opposed to the Western knowledge, which says any "Energy" or attribute we can give to God (Love, Goodness, etc) is fully undifferentiated from "Essence", and so complete knowledge of God is only possible through beholding his Essence, something that can happen only in the beatific vision... but that's really beyond the scope of what I am able to discuss here.) As Fr. John pointed out in my philosophy class, observe Rublev's icon here of the Transfiguration: the light on the mountain was not mere created light, as shown in Raphael's painting (fully consonant with the Western method of reaching God through natural epistemology); the light is a divine, uncreated light, illuminating all and casting no shadows, even while Christ himself is also surrounded by a cloud of mystery. Defending Symeon, Palamas adds that we do experience the divine through our own senses, although not through any power of their own; God grants them additional supernatural powers so that the divine glory may be perceived through the eyes, as the disciples *saw* Christ becoming transfigured before them (although not that he changed; simply that their eyes were opened to the glory of God by supernatural gift).
This is the highly condensed form of part of my thought on part of the issue. Questions left that still need whole books to answer:
-why something rather than nothing? why should things spill over, from nothing into something, from our thoughts to others, charity itself being a spilling over and gift of our very self - what can we say about this Divine fruitfulness that leaves its traces in all creation, and in what ways?
-the way humans communicate through matter
-the ontological differences of mind and matter
-the way that a mind participates in mediation, both receiving and sending forth
-how the Incarnation, as God's word to us, gives us some license to mediate*
-what happens to non-human minds (i.e. angels) whose nature God did not assume
-what constitutes divine illumination, such that purification should be necessary to receive it (if it makes sense to talk about that)
-how Western mystics, without a distinction between Essence/Energies, can talk about union with God
-how what the mystics say is related to us "ordinary people," who either are not called, or not listening their call to such union
-what is meaning in general, anyway?
I could think of so many more. Do you understand how difficult it is to even look at such a dazzling saturation, much less blog on it?
*You'll notice I did not, in fact, write on the Incarnation in this post. That is too daunting and hard.
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